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OBJECTIONS TO PLEADINGS UNDER THE NEW
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
JAMES A. PIKE t
FROM its origin in the fourteenth century until the beginning of Eng-
lish procedural reform the chief office of the demurrer had been to compel
pleaders to follow the exact forms and phrases to which long usage
had lent sanctity. As late as 1797, Chief Justice Eyre, discussing a
trifling defect in pleading, observed:
"You must argue it as a mere point of form; if you attempt to argue
on substance, you must fail. This is a slip in form; but it is always
the best way to make the party pay for this kind of slip, if advantage
is taken of it by special demurrer. Infinite mischief has been
produced by the facility of courts in overlooking these errors; it
encourages carelessness, and places ignorance too much upon a foot-
ing with knowledge among those who practise the drawing of plead-
ings. . . The party . . . must pay for his blunder."'
This purpose the demurrer accomplished very effectively: the plaintiff
recovered judgment if the demurrer was overruled; the defendant if
it was sustained. There is no doubt that the extreme penalty of failure
on demurrer trained expert craftsmen in the art of pleading. And in
an earlier view of the judicial process this discipline was of value.2
But adherence to form is no longer viewed as an end in itself. The
present-day objective of pleading is generally assumed to be the efficient
determination of the real issues to be tried, and we are now inclined
to doubt the wisdom of punishing a litigant for the failure of his counsel
to observe the strict letter of the rules of pleading. The demurrer, in
keeping with this change in attitude, has consequently lost its lethal effect.
Thus, if the demurrer is sustained, the pleader is not penalized by loss
of judgment, but is given the opportunity to amend his pleading;' if
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1. Morgan v. Sargent, 1 Bos. & P. 58, 59-60 (C. P. 1797) (italics added).
2. See Lord Hobart's observation on the Statute 27 ELTZ., C. 5 (1585), requiring
that demurrers for matters of form be special: "Now the moderation of this statute is
such that it does not utterly reject form: for that were a dishonour to the law, and to
make it in effect no art. . . . " Heard v. Baskervile, Hob. 232 (K. B. 1615); see
CmiTTr, PLEADING *639; see also (1897) 10 HAxv. L. Rxv. 238.
3. See ANNuAL PRAcTIcE (1935) 458 et seq.; see also p. 65 et seq., infra.
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the demurrer is overruled the demurrant is free to plead4 and his ad-
mission arguendo of the facts alleged in the pleading attacked may not
be invoked against him at the trial.5
Desirable as is this recasting of values, the demurrer has proved to
be ill-adapted to perform its new function, for it is susceptible to abuse.
In an earlier period, when the ruling on the demurrer terminated the
action, it was strategic to demur only for clear defects of form or
substance.6 But since the ruling no longer serves to end the litigation
but merely postpones the trial, the demurrer is used as a convenient
means of delay by counsel with too much business or too little ambition.
And where further delay is desired counsel may invoke separately the
several motions which exist concurrently with the demurrer: motions
to strike, expunge, elect or separate; motions to make more definite and
certain or for a bill of particulars. This multiplicity of weapons has in-
evitably led to a host of tenuous distinctions: whether demurrer or mo-
tion is proper, what kind of demurrer, what kind of motion. By the
-use of successive demurrers and motions, it is possible, then, not only
to delay but also to discourage altogether the party whose pleading is
subjected to this barrage of objections.7
One of the most worthwhile aspects of the proposed Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,' now before the Supreme Court for consideration,
4. E.g., CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 472; Mnir. STAT. (Mason,
1927) §9279; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11362. Even at common law the courts
eased the rules to allow the defendant to "withdraw" his demurrer and plead. See
Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Denio 238 (N.Y. 1846). But the traditional view is expressed
by an early writer: "If a Demurrer be entered, it cannot be waived, as is said, except
both the Plaintiff and Defendant do consent unto it, nor then without leave of the court;
because by the Demurrer, both Parties have submitted the Matters in La,, in Question
betwixt them, to the Judgment of the Court." GARDINER, INsTRucTo CLE IcALIs, BEING
A COLLECTION OF LAWS RELATING To DEMURRERS (1714) lb.
5. Sprague v. New York & N. E. R. R., 68 Conn. 345, 36 Ad. 791 (1896);
Blizzard v. Brown, 152 Wis. 160, 139 N. AV. 737 (1913).
6. See Lord Coke in Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. 12b, 14b (F. B. 1581); BRoDm-
INNES, COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND: COunrs
AN) PRo EDURE (1903) 421.
7. Sometimes delay is a means to an end more vital than mere discouragement.
If the original complaint does not state a cause of action, the statute of limitations may
run and bar the amended complaint. Walters v. Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651
(1909) ; Wigmore, Civil Procedure and Football-Defeating a Valid Claim by Pleading
and Then Denmurring, While the Statute of Limitations Runs (1910) 4 ILL. L REy. 344.
See p. 68, infra.
8. These Rules, designed to provide uniform procedure in law and equity for the
federal courts, were authorized by 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U.S.C. §§723b, 723c (1934).
Two drafts of the Rules have been published: PRELimINARY Dar oF THE RULES OF
Crviz PROCEDURE FOR THE Dismcr COURTS OF THE UNrrn STATEs AND Tran SuPrxnE
CoURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLumBA (May, 1936); REPORT OF Tre ADvIsoRY Co umIUE
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is the attempt to minimize the dilatory effect of objections to pleadings.
Under Rule 12 the demurrer is abolished and superseded by the answer
or motion. Motion practice itself has been simplified by the expedient
of requiring all objections to the pleadings to be made simultaneously.
A complete understanding of these reforms requires a consideration
of the demurrer and the various procedural forms which in the past
half century have been designed to replace it.
I. THE DEMURRER AND ITS COUNTERPARTS
Four existing forms analogous to the ancient demurrer in law" were
considered as important precedents in the drafting of the Rules: the
modified demurrer found in most states, the objection in law found in
England, the motion to dismiss of the Federal Equity Rules, and the
motion for judgment used in New York and in some other states.
The demurrer practice on the law side of the federal courts, which
follows the procedure of the several states under the Conformity Act,1 0
hardly furnished a suitable pattern for reform. The statutes of some
states, patterned after the English Common Law Procedure Act of
1852,11 eliminate the purely formal grounds of demurrer. 2 Others have
preserved the special demurrer for formal defects as provided in the
English Statute of 1585."3 The Codes of some western states, for ex-
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ON RULES FOR CML PROCEDURE (April, 1937).
These are hereafter cited as PREaniixARY DRAFT and COmmirrEE REProRT, respectively.
On the movement for the adoption of the Rules and their general scope see Clark
and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: L The Background (1935) 44 YALE L. J.
387; II. Pleadings and Parties (1935) id. at 1291; Clark, Power of the Supreme Court
to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1303; Sunderland, The
Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States (1934)
32 MICH. L. REv. 1116; Pike, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 12
CALIF. STATE BAR J. 192; (1936) 22 A.B.A.J. 787, 809 (symposium).
9. For a complete discussion of the early history of the demurrer and its civil
law counterparts, see Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer (1936) 31 ILL. Rav. 429,
(1937) id. 596.
10. REv. STAT. §§914-916 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §§724, 726, 727 (1934), providing
that pleading and practice in the district courts shall conform as nearly as possible to
the practice in the courts of record of the state in which the district court is located.
See CL.AR, CODE PLEADING (1928) 23-24; Comment (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 602.
11. 15 & 16 Vcr. c. 76, § 50; see BRODIE-INNES, loc. cit. supra note 6.
12. A.A. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 9479 ("No demurrer in pleading can be
allowed but to matter of substance, which the party demurring specifies; and no
objection can be taken or allowed which is not distinctly stated in the demurrer.");
FLA. CoMP. GEN. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 1927) § 4304; HAWAII REv. LAWS (1935)
§§ 4091-4092; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyers' Co-op. 1933) c. 231, § 18 (also allows
demurrer for misjoinder of causes); TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 8784. In
some of these jurisdictions formal defects may be attacked by a motion to strike. See
note 82, infra.
13. 27 ELIZ., C. 5 (1585). This statute was clarified by 4 ANNE, c. 16 (1706).
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ample, indicate "uncertainty," "ambiguity" and "unintelligibility" as
three distinct grounds of demurrer, and counsel customarily raise each
ground specifically and separately, fearing - with some justification-
that each term differs in application.14 In another group of states the
requirement found in the special demurrer that the ground of insuffi-
ciency be specifically stated has been extended to the general demurrer,
that is, the demurrer for insufficiency in law."
The motion to dismiss provided in Rule 29 of the Federal Equity Rules
of 1911 furnished a more encouraging precedent.' This motion was in
large part derived from the English procedure under the Judicature Act.'7
Pursuant to the power given it by this Act, the English Supreme Court
in 1883 abolished the demurrer and substituted a simpler procedure.' 8
Objections to a point of law may be raised in the pleadings along with
the answer on the facts ;"9 the case proceeds, and the objections are dis-
posed of at or after the trial. In this fashion the use of the demurrer
as a dilatory expedient is prevented. The orders provide tvo methods
14. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1935) §§430(7), (8), (9). Similar provisions
are found in Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Porto Rico. There is
apparently some basis for the practise of specifying each ground. In Kraner v. Halsey,
82 Cal. 209, 22 Pac. 1137 (1889), the defendant demurred on the three grounds in the
conjunctive; the demurrer was sustained. The California Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that, although the complaint was clearly uncertain, it was not ambiguous,
and probably not unintelligible; hence it was not "ambiguous, unintelligible and un-
certain." The court, after quoting a couplet from Milton, reasoned that uncertainty did
not include ambiguity. Other decisions seem to have viewed the words as synonymous.
See Churchill v. Lauer, 84 Cal. 233, 234, 24 Pac. 107, (1890); Heeser v. Miller, 77 Cal.
192, 19 Pac. 375 (1888).
15. MASs. ANN. LAWs (Lawyers' Co-op. 1933) c. 231, § 18. Similar provisions
are found in Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Tennessee and other states. For the text of
the Alabama section, see note 12, supra.
• 16. 226 U. S., 649-674 (1911). On the merits of Rule 29 see Lane, JJ'orhing under
Federal Equity Rules (1915) 29 H~Av. L. REv. 55, 66.
17. 35 & 36 Vzcr., c. 66 (1873). As amended the Act appears in AX:.uAL PnAcrCcE
(1935) 2347 et seq.
18. RuEs oF THE SUPREME CoUnT (1883) 0. xxv, r. 1; see ANNUAL PrAcTicE
(1935) 422. In the first Orders adopted by the Supreme Court under the Act, the
demurrer for failure to state a cause of action had been preserved. RULES OF SUPREME
COURT (1875) 0. xxviii; see GRIFFIrH, PRAcricE UNDER TnE JUDICATURE Acts (1875)
215.
19. The mode of stating an objection at law is indicated by examples given in an
appendix to the Rules. If the case is for slander actionable only by reason of special
damage, the defense, in law and fact, may be: "The defendant says that: (1) The
defendant did not speak or publish the words. (2) The words did not refer to the
plaintiff. (3) The defendant will object that the special damage stated is not sufficient
in point of law to sustain the action.' RULES OF THE SUPREME CoUner (1883) App. E,
§3, No. 2; ANNUAL PaAcncu (1935) 1695.
In special circumstances a point of law may be set down for argument before trial
even though not raised by the pleadings. Mangena v. Wright, (1909] 2 K. B. 958.
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to effect the primary purpose of the objection in law- the raising of
issues of law apart from issues of fact in order to render a trial on the
facts unnecessary. First, the court may order a pleading struck out if
it discloses no reasonable cause of action or ground of defense.20 This
is proper only when the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action is so
evident that any judge can say at once that the declaration is insufficient,
even if the averments be proved, to entitle the plaintiff to what he asks.
2 1
Secondly, by consent of the parties or by order of the court on the appli-
cation of either party, an objection in law may be set down for a hearing
to be held at any time before the trial.2 If the decision on the point of
law disposes substantially of the action or defense, the court may dismiss
the suit or make any other appropriate order.
23
Under Equity Rule 29, demurrers and pleas were abolished, and "every
defense in point of law arising upon the face of the bill" was to be made
by a motion to dismiss or in the answer.24 Though similar to the English
order, this rule differs in two particulars. First, while the English order
provided that the objections be raised in pleadings only, the equity rule
20. RULES OF THE SUPREM COURT (1883) 0. xxv, r. 4; see ANNUAL PRAcTxcZ
(1935) 424.
21. Hubbuck v. Wilkinson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 86, 91 (C. A.); see Burstall v. Beyfus,
26 Ch. D. 35, 38 (1884).
22. RULEs OF THE SUPREME COURT (1883) 0. xxv, r. 2. Under some circumstances
the point of law may be argued at the trial as a preliminary matter. Osborne v. Society
of Railway Servants, [1911] 1 Ch. 540. But this requires an order.
23. Ibid. Considerable liberality is allowed the court in its disposition of the matter.
If the objection taken on the record is upheld, and yet the court feels that the pleading
can be corrected by amendment, the court will generally grant the party in fault leave
to amend, assessing him for the costs of the argument. Richards v. Butcher, 62 L. T. R.
(ms.) 867 (Ch. D. 1890). But if the decision on the hearing substantially disposts of
the controversy, the court will dismiss the action with costs. O'Brien v. Tyssen, 28 Ch.
D. 372 (1885) ; Percival v. -Dunn, 29 Ch. D. 128 (1885).
The order of dismissal may be final or interlocutory. Bozson v. Altrincham Dist.
Council, [1903] 1 K. B. 547; In re Croasdell, [1906] 2 K. B. 569. Contra: Salaman v.
Warner, [1891] 1 Q. B. 734 (court has no power to make an interlocutory order of
dismissal).
24. The rule reads: "Demurrers and pleas are abolished. Every defense in point of
law arising upon the face of the bill, whether for misjoinder, nonjoinder, or insufficiency
of fact to constitute a valid cause of action in equity, which might heretofore have been
made by demurrer or plea, shall be made by motion to dismiss or in the answer; and
every such point of law going to the whole or a material part of the cause or cause
of action stated in the bill may be called up and disposed of before final hearing at the
discretion of the court. Every defense heretofore presentable by plea in bar or abate-
ment shall be made in the answer and may be separately heard and disposed of before
the trial of the principal case in the discretion of the court. If the defendant move to
dismiss the bill or any part thereof, the motion may be set down for hearing by either
party upon five days' notice, and, if it be denied, answer shall be filed within five days
thereafter or a decree pro confesso entered."
For a detailed discussion of the present practice under Rule 29, see pp. 59-62, infra.
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perpetuated an unnecessary step by permitting the alternative of a motion
to dismiss. Secondly, the equity rule states that "every point of law
going to the whole or a material part of the cause or causes of action
stated in the bill may be called up and disposed of before final hearing
in the discretion of the court." Although in the English procedure the
materiality of the issue is a criterion in deciding whether to dismiss
the action after the preliminary hearing on the objection in law, ma-
teriality is not a limitation on the English courts in deciding whether
to grant this hearing," and if the parties consent, the court is compelled
to decide the issue before trial. Here the federal equity procedure ap-
pears to be preferable,27 for unless it be required that the point of law
raised by the objection go "to the whole or a material part of the cause"
of action, the utility of the separate hearing on the issue of law in ter-
minating the action will not be achieved in practice, and the purpose
of the abolition of the ancient demurrer will be defeated. 3
In this respect the provisions in the four states which have followed
the Federal Equity Rules in abolishing the demurrer represent a retro-
gressive step. The New Jersey provision of 1912 lacks the test of
materiality: a hearing is required in any event when the objection is
raised by motion; and the court may determine the question before
trial on the motion of either party if the objection is raised in the plead-
ings.29 Under the New York Civil Practice Act of 1920, since all objec-
tions in law are to be made by a motion for judgment, the elimination
of the preliminary hearing is made impossible.3 0 This is also the result
of the Pennsylvania31 and Illinois3 2 provisions. The difference between
the operation of the abolished demurrer and of the pre-trial hearing
25. See note 31, supra.
26. In practice the materiality of the issue is often the criterion. Robinson v. Fenner,
[1913] 3 K. B. 835. But even where the issue is material, a preliminary hearing ,ill
not be granted, if the trial is likely to throw more light on the matter. Isaacs & Sons
v. Cook, [1925] 2 KB. 391.
27. The rule proposed in the model Rules of Civil Procedure of the American Judi-
cature Society has a similar limitation of materiality. (1919) Am. Juu. Soc. BuLL.,
No. xiv, 68-69.
28. See p. 57, infra.
29. N. J. PuB. LAWs 1912, p. 377, Schedule A, Rule 26; see HArms, PLxADIN
AND PRAcricE In NEw JERsEY (1926) § 338 et seq. Similar provisions are found in
McIH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 14,120.
30. N. Y. Civ. Pa~c. Acr (1920) § 277. For a comparison of the New York and
New Jersey provisions see RmRT oF TnE JoiNr LEGiSLATrm Cosnxrrz our rn Sru-
PLrFIcATioN oF CiviL PR.cricE, N. Y. LE. Doc. No. 111 (1919) 191.
31. P.& STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, §§385, 471, enacted in 1915. Under
this statute, the objection is raised by an "affidavit of defense."
32. Iml ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 110, § 169. For a general discussion
of the reforms in pleading under the new Illinois Act see Clark, The Ner Illinois CiWn
Practice Act (1933) 1 U. OF C1. L REv. 209.
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required by the statutes of these three states is so slight that apparently
only the name "demurrer" has been eliminated.
II. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE
In the preliminary draft of the new Federal Rules, 3 the recommenda-
tions of the Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court for the rule on
defenses34 adopted the best features of the English procedure and of
the Federal Equity Rules of 1911. All objections of law or fact, except
several that were specified, were to be raised in the answer- in effect
the provision of the English order.3" And in granting the separate hear-
ing on the objection the criterion was whether the decision on the suffi-
ciency of the pleading would "finally dispose of the whole or a material
part of the issues"- the provision of the federal equity rule.
In the final draft, presented to the Supreme Court in April, 1937,0
several modifications appear, two of which seem undesirable. First,
objections may be raised by motion as well as by answer, as under the
Equity Rules- a provision that adds another and an unnecessary pro-
cedural step. Secondly, a hearing on an objection may be granted at
the request of either party, unless the court orders otherwise.3" Under
this rule a hearing on the objection will, perhaps, be the normal practice;
the preliminary draft was worded to make the hearing the exception.
This change is regrettable. While it is true that in some instances rulings
33. See note 8, supra.
34. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, Rule 16.
35. Another precedent for the junction of objections of law and of fact in the
answer is furnished by an early Virginia statute providing for optional junction. Act
of Dec. 22, 1788, § 40, 12 STAT. AT LARGE (Hening, 1792) 745; see Millar, supra note 9,
at 628.
36. The provision on "Defenses-How Presented by Pleading and Motion" reads:
"Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party-claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process,
(5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to
that claim for relief." ComrmE REPoRT, Rule 12(b).
37. The rule on "Preliminary Hearings" provides: "The defenses specifically enu-
merated .(1)-(6) in subdivision (b) of this rule [see note 36, supraJ, whether made in
a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c)
of this rule, shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial." Commnrr REPORT, Rule 12(d).
[Vol. 47: 50
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on demurrer or on motion to dismiss may dispose of the controversy
ivithout a trial of the facts, judicial statistics show that such cases are
few.38 That in the large number of cases the demurrer does not ter-
minate the action may indicate in part the frivolity of the objection.
Perhaps the best solution of the problem is to be found in the test of
materiality rejected in the final draft, for while the federal courts have
varied considerably in applying this criterion under the Equity Rules,
it appears that the test was well devised to separate the frivolous or
immaterial objection from the well-grounded or material objection. Ad-
vance determination has been encouraged, for example, where its use
might avoid the expense of a long and burdensome hearing on the
merits,39 or where the legal issues were complicated and the fact issues
were relatively simple." Generally, however, the aim of eliminating the
preliminary step of a hearing on objections in law has been achieved
by a proper exercise of judicial discretion in refusing to grant a hear-
ing.4 ' This attitude is well expressed in Boyd v. New York & Harlem
Railroad:'
"I am of opinion that no legal point (going to less than the whole
case) should be decided in advance of final hearing, unless such de-
cision will add to or eliminate from the case a clearly defined and
easily stated mass of testimony, the presence or absence of which will
not change or affect the method of presenting the other aspects of the
litigation."
Despite these probable defects in the final draft of the rule on defenses,
it embodies definite advances over the present demurrer practice. There
38. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II. Pleadings and Parties
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1294, 1308, n. 76. In a survey of Connecticut cases it was
found that in only 25 cases of 363 in which a demurrer was filed was judgment entered
as a result. CLAR.C & SHULMAN, LAw AD.mINISTRATION I CO.-UECTICUT (1937) 218;
cf. A STUDY OF THE BusiNESS OF THE FEDmAL CoUwTs, PART II, CIvIL CASES (1934)
c. v and vi; (1919) Am. JuD. Soc. BULL. No. xiv, 69.
39. Chase Nat Bank v. Sayles, 6 F. (2d) 403 (D. R. I. 1925), rov'd on other
grounds, 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
40. Mallinson v. Ryan, 242 Fed. 951 (S. D. N. Y. 1917) (case involved the infringe-
ment of simple design patents; a mere inspection of the patent was all that would be
necessary on final hearing); see Chase v. Reliable Mfg. Co., 58 F. (2d) 676 (N. D.
Ill. 1932); I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 270 Fed. 593, 596 (D. Mass.
1920) ;. cf. Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 281 Fed. 186 (E. D.
Pa. 1922).
41. Cf. Ralston Steel Car Co. v. National Dump Car Co., 222 Fed. 590 (D. Me.
1915) ; Wright v. Barnard, 233 Fed. 329 (D. Del. 1915); O'Keefe v. New Orleans,
273 Fed. 560 (E. D. La. 1921), aff'd, 280 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). Where the
case involves many intricate details whose full import is not apparent from the pleadings,
the court is likely to require the matter to go to proof and decide the question of law
later. Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate Confectionery Co., 281 Fed. 186 (E. D
Pa. 1922).
42. 220 Fed. 174, 179 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
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has been more than a change in name. Since the answer may be used
for objections in law, unnecessary delay may be obviated by those de-
fendants who desire a speedy adjudication of the issues. Moreover, the
hearing on the objection may be eliminated, at least in same cases, by
progressive judges. And, while it was not certain under the Equity Rules
whether the motion could be made only before the answer,43 the new
rule removes this doubt by a provision that the motion "shall be made
before pleading if further pleading is permitted."44 Finally, the entirely
new provision for a consolidated motion 41 makes almost impossible the
worrying of plaintiffs by a succession of demurrers and motions: with
the exception of defenses as to jurisdictions, process, and venue,40 and
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, all objections which a party
may want to raise by motion, including the motion to make more definite
and certain and for a bill of particulars, 47 the motion to strike,48 and the
objection in law, must be raised at one time - either concurrently or in
a consolidated motion. Once a motion is filed, the right to raise by further
motion objections not included is in effect waived.49  And under the
language of this provision a party may, if he wishes, include in the
consolidated motion objections as to jurisdiction, process, and venue.
Because of the retention of the familiar motion for judgment on the
pleadings, objections as to the substance of the cause of action or defense
43. Compare United States v. Railway Employes Dept., 286 Fed. 228, 230 (N. D.
Ill. 1923) with Andrew Jergens Co. v. Bonded Products Corp., 9 F. (2d) 114 (E. D.
N. Y. 1925).
44. Commsi=m REPoRT, Rule 12(b) ; see note 36, iqra.
45. "Consolidation of Motions. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for; and if he makes such a motion and
does not include therein all grounds of motion which are then available to him, he shall
not be permitted thereafter to make a motion based on any of the grounds so omitted;
except that prior to making any other such motions under this rule he may make a
motion presenting objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
or over the person, or to the sufficiency of the process or its service, or to venue;
and except that he may make a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as stated in
subdivision (h) of this rule." Commim REoRT, Rule 12(g).
46. Provided for in CommiTTEE REPORT, Rule 12(b).
47. Coi=xxnxx REPoRT, Rule 12(e). See pp. 62-65, infra.
48. COMMITE REPoRT, Rule 12(f). See p. 62, infra.
49. More explicit on the subject of "Waiver of Defenses" is subdivision (h):
"Except as stated in this subdivision of this rule, a party waives all defenses and objec-
tions if he does not present them either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he
has made no motion, in his answer or reply. The defenses or objections for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted even though previously presented,
or to state a legal defense to a claim, may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on' the merits;
but if made at the trial, shall then be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the
light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears by suggestion
of the parties, or otherwise, that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter,
it shall dismiss the action." ComximE REPoRT, Rule 12(h).
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may be raised at any time after the pleadings are closed and "in such
time as not to delay the trial."50 After the trial has begun counsel may
still object to the legal insufficiency of the opposing pleading; but in
ruling on the objection at this time the court will dispose of the motion
in the light of the evidence that has been received."'
The new rule does not pretend, however, to adumbrate all the details
in the picture: whether on objection the averments of the complaint are
to be taken as true, whether facts outside of the attacked pleading may
be considered, whether res judicata applies to a dismissal on the motion,
and so forth. As was true under the Federal Equity Rules, such ques-
tions must be determined with little help from the language of the rule
itself; hence it is necessary to advert to the motion practice under the
Equity Rules and the earlier demurrer practice precedents. Yet a caveat
is necessary. Since, prior to the adoption of the Equity Rules, the
demurrer was used in federal equity cases for defects both of substance
and of form, 2 many cases decided before 1911 are not pertinent. Equity
Rule 29 limited the motion to dismiss to defects of substance and of
joinder;53 similar limitations are found in the new rule.
In many respects the theory of the motion under the federal equity
practice has followed the theory of the demurrer." The motion to dis-
miss may not tender an issue of fact;5 like the demurrer, it may raise
legal issues only." Similarly, for the purpose of the motion all the
50. Co-dsi- nEE REPoRT, Rule 12(c). This motion, common in code states, calls for
an immediate judgment founded on the pleadings without the hearing of any evidence.
While somewhat similar to the general demurrer and its counterpart motions, it differs
in that it is made after issue is joined and the decision upon it is a judgment. N. Y.
RULES Civ. PRAc. (1936) Rule 112 is a typical provision.
51. CoiurrTEE REPORT, Rules 12(h) and 15(b).
52. See generally 1 BATES, FEn.RAL EQ UITY ProcEDuE (1901) §§ 177 cf seq.;
SHIPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING (1897) 364.
53. Cf. Tilden v. Barber, 227 Fed. 1010 (D. N. J. 1915). Clearly the motion in
equity was not intended to be coextensive with the old demurrer. It is therefore not
'accurate to say, as several federal courts have said, that "defenses which would previously
have been presented by demurrer must be presented by motion to dismiss." General
Bakelite Co. v. Nikolas, 207 Fed. 111 (E. D. N. Y. 1913); see also Martin v. James
B. Berry Sons' Co., 83 F. (2d) 857 (C. C A. 1st, 1936) ; HUGHES, FrEnEML PRiACTIC
(1931) § 4352. Objections to form may not be raised by a motion to dismiss. United
States v. American Brewing Co., 1 F. (2d) 1001 (E. D. Pa. 1924); United States v.
Ali, 7 F. (2d) 728 (E. D. Mich. 1925). But cf. Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
274 Fed. 104 (D. Del. 1921) (bill dismissed for prolixity).
54. The courts have regarded the two practices as sufficiently alike so that where a
"demurrer" is filed it will be viewed as a "motion to dismiss." Thome v. Lynch, 269
Fed. 995 (D. Minn. 1921).
55. Badger Co. v. Arnold, 282 Fed. 115 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922) ; ef. ,estern Distribut-
ing Co. v. Public Service Comm., 58 F. (2d) 239 (D. Kan. 1931).
56. A demurrer which introduces allegations of fact is a "speaking demurrer" and
may be disregarded. United States v. Forbes, 259 Fed. 585 (M. D. Ala. 1919), aff'd
sub. iwm., Forbes v. United States, 268 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. Sth, 1920); Union Trust
Co. v. Wilson, 182 N. C. 166, 108 S. E. 500 (1921).
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allegations of the bill are taken as admitted." The theory of the motion,
like the theory of the demurrer, is that the motion will be granted if
the complaint is insufficient to state a cause of action even though all
its allegations are assumed to be true. Moreover, there is the familiar
rule that every intendment must be in favor of the pleader."8 Finally,
the two practices have in common the general principle that no facts
outside of the attacked pleading may be considered on the hearing."'
Allegations in the answer, statements of counsel, and information in
affidavits are all irrelevant for this purpose.6" Nothing outside of the
bill may aid in its support, and, conversely, the defect to which the ob-
jection is directed must in fact appear on the face of the bill. This,
of course, is in accord with the theory of the demurrer.
In those instances where the motion is granted, what effect does the
dismissal have? Clearly, if the dismissal is for want of jurisdiction,
it must also be without prejudice, since the very filing of the complaint
is viewed conceptually as a nullity.6 A dismissal for lack of equity
jurisdiction 'on the ground that the complainant has an adequate legal
remedy, likewise must be without prejudice. 2 But there is some con-
fusion in the cases as to the effect of a dismissal under Equity Rule 29
-confusion which may continue under the language of the new rule.
57. Woodall v. Clark, 254 Fed. 526 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); Everglades Drainage
League v. Broward Drainage Dist., 253 Fed. 246 (S. D. Fla. 1918), appeal dismissed,
251 U. S. 567 (1920); see 3 LoNGsDORF, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PaOCEDURE (1928)
§ 834. As in the case of the demurrer, this rule does not extend to the conclusions of
the pleader. Amalgamated Royalty Oil Corp. v. Hemme, 282 Fed. 750 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922). Nor does it extend to allegations inconsistent with matters of which the court
must take judicial notice. Nev-Cal Elec. Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 85 F.
(2d) 886 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). In any event the "admission" may not be urged against
the demurrant at the trial. See note 5, supra.
58. Bayley & Songs v. Blumberg, 254 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). See p. 62,
and cases cited in notes 71-73, infra.
59. Betts v. Lewis, 19 How. 72 (U.S. 1856); Krouse v. Brevard Tannin Co.,
249 Fed. 538 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918). A bill of particulars or an attached exhibit is
regarded as part of the bill. American Voting Mach. Co. v. City of New York, 2 F.
Supp. 191 (S. D. N. Y. 1933). Compare the rule applied under demurrer practice in
Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 274 Fed. 659 (N. D. Ohio, 1920).
60. Conway v. White, 292 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) (allegations in answer) ;
Arneson v. Denny, 25 F. (2d) 988 (W. D. Wash. 1928) (allegations in answer); Jack-
son v. Hooper, 171 Fed. 597 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909) (statements of counsel); Ussesa
Saxen Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 2 F. Supp. 190 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) (affidavits). But see
Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 271 Fed. 958 (W. D. Wash. 1921), where
the bill was dismissed on the strength of an affidavit showing that the question at issue
had become moot; Boyd v. New York & H. R. R., 220 Fed. 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1915),
where the court was willing to take into consideration the allegations and admissions of
defendant's pleading, the motion to dismiss having been made after answer.
61. General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R. R., 271 U. S. 228 (1926).
62. This was settled long before the adoption of the Equity Rules. Horsburg v.
Baker, 1 Pet. 232 (U. S. 1828) ; Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119 (1892).
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Here again the demurrer practice may furnish an analogy. According
to the better view, the mere sustaining of the demurrer affects no rights;
thus the ruling on the demurrer is not an appealable order." The judg-
ment after the demurrer, however, is res judicata.a It is necessary to
maintain this distinction under the motion practice if the federal cases
are to be reconciled, for it has been held that, while a decree of dismissal
is res fudicata6 5 the granting of the motion to dismiss is not.c Yet
"granting the motion to dismiss" would seem to be equivalent to a
"dismissal." The dichotomy is clearly unnecessary and should not be
retained in interpreting the new Rules.
The motion practice, however, departs from the demurrer precedents
at several points. In theory there is a difference in the significance of
the paper filed before the hearing. In one case, the document which
the defendant files and serves upon the plaintiff is itself the "demurrer."' t
The subsequent oral hearing, "the argument on the demurrer," has a
subsidiary character; the effective legal act is the filing and serving of
the paper. But the paper filed and served upon the plaintiff is merely
a "notice of motion"; the motion itself is made at the hearing and is
the effective legal act. Of more practical significance is the change under
the motion practice in the effect of a general objection to a complaint
containing several counts. Although a general demurrer to the whole
of a pleading will fail if any count is good,"s a motion to dismiss that
goes to the entire bill may be sustained as to part."0 But where the
defendant intends to attack only part of the pleading, his motion must
specify that part and must indicate the particular ground of objection."
63. Statutes and decisions are collected in (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 905.
64. Although it is generally agreed that the judgment is res judicata, there is a
conflict over the extent of its effect. Under one rule although no later suit can be
brought upon the same facts nor can the affirmative allegations used in the first suit
be denied, the omission of an essential allegation may be corrected in the later action.
Under the other rule the judgment is viewed as an adjudication of the whole controversy
and concludes both the issues actually passed upon and those which could have arisen
had the action continued. CLAIM, CODE PLEADING (1928) 367.
65. Hickey v. Johnson, 9 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925), mandamus to enforce
decree granted, 22 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
66. San Francisco v. McLaughlin, 9 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Westing-
house Traction Brake Co. v. Orr, 252 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
67. Before the introduction of formal pleadings the term "demurrer" denoted the
ruling of the court on the objection. But since the fourteenth century it has indicated
the objection itself. See note 4, mipra.
68. SHmm.&N, CoamoNr LAw PLEADING (3d ed. 1928) 281.
69. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 250 Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 6th,
1918).
70. Everglades Drainage League v. Brovward Drainage Dist, 253 Fed. 246 (S.D.
Fla. 1918), appeal disnissed, 251 U. S. 567 (1920) ; Commodores Point Terminal Co. v.
Hudnall, 283 Fed. 150 (S. D. Fla. 1922).
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Different, too, is the liberal attitude of the courts in their treatment
of the pleading attacked. Mere indefiniteness of statement will not sup-
port a motion to dismiss if, generously construed, the bill seems to state
a cause of action.71 As stated in a leading decision, "A case in equity
involving important matters should go to issues and proof, where a
doubtful question is presented by the pleadings." 72 With the merger
of law and equity under the new Rules73 this liberality should, of course,
extend to both types of action.
III. OBJECTIONS AS TO FORM
Although the new federal rule on defenses has in general attempted
to discourage objections for form it recognizes that for at least two
types of formal defects a remedy is desirable. First, if the complaint
is vague the defendant may be hampered in preparing his answer. The
motion for more definite statement and for bill of particulars is pro-
vided to attack this defect. Second, if the complaint is encumbered with
irrelevant counts or allegations, the pleadings will fail in one of their
functions, guidance of the trial by the limitation of issues. For defects
of this kind the new Rules provide the motion to strike.74
The provision for the latter motion has preserved the phraseology of
the Equity Rules, which in turn had adopted the terms familiar in federal
and state practice. 5 Thus at the motion of any party or on its own
initiative the court may at any time "order any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter stricken from any pleading."' But on
motions as to certainty the Federal courts are at present applying under
the Conformity Act a welter of rules. While some courts have been
fairly liberal in attitude,77 others, in attempting to develop nice distinc-
tions between the motion for bill of particulars and the motion to make
71. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 Fed. 127 (E. D. Mo. 1916).
72. United States v. Railway Employes' Dept., 286 Fed. 228, 230 (N. D. I11. 1923).
And the bill need not be dismissed even where it appears that there is an adequate rem-
edy at law if the subject-matter of the action is within the jurisdiction of the court,
Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primos Chem. Co., 225 Fed. 769 (E. D. Pa. 1915) ; Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Kiehne, 277 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
73. Corinarz REoa, Rules 1 and 2.
74. As already indicated, the procedure for objections to pleadings should be con-
siderably expedited by a requirement that objections in law, motions to make more
certain and for bill of particulars, and motions to strike be raised concurrently and be
heard at one time.
75. See Equity Rule 12.
76. Comixirn REPORT, Rule 12 (f); see also PmELIINARY DRAfn, Rule 17.
77. See, e.g., Conover v. Knight, 84 Wis. 639, 642, 54 N. W. 1002 (1893) ; Stocklea
v. Barrett, 58 Ore. 281, 114 Pac. 108 (1911).
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more definite and certain, 8 have created disharmony and inconsistency.
In some western states only the motion for bill of particulars is recog-
nized, and it is limited to suits upon an account.7" In these jurisdictions
the function of the motion to make more definite and certain is some-
what fulfilled by special demurrers for uncertainty, ambiguity, and un-
intelligibility80 - three more nice distinctions. In two states the situa-
tion is even further complicated by the recognition, in addition to these
three special demurrers, of both the motion to make more definite and
certain and the motion for bill of particulars.$' There are thus five de-
vices for substantially the same purpose! Again, in some jurisdictions,
uncertain pleadings may be attacked by a motion to strike.a2
The proposed federal rule should avoid the difficulty and confusion
attendant on the use of seperate motions. The motion is defined to elim-
inate any quibble over the distinction between a motion to make more
definite and certain and a motion for a bill of particulars:
"Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, within 20 days after the service of the
pleading upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement
or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to pre-
pare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial."83
A single remedy will be available whenever there is such vagueness or
lack of particularity in a pleading that the opposite party may be in
doubt as to its full extent and meaning. The rule also requires that
the motion point out specifically the defects complained of and the details
desired."4 And by the provision that "a bill of particulars when filed
becomes part of the pleading which it supplements," Rule 12 specifically
rejects the narrow views adopted by some courts that the bill adds noth-
78. Wilson v. Pearson, 13 Fed. 386 (C. C. N. Y. 1882); Groton Iron Works v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 283 Fed. 812 (D. Conn. 1922);
Harrington v. Stillman, 120 App. Div. 659, 105 N. Y. Supp. 75 (3rd Dep't 1907).
79. California practice is typical. The requirement of the particulars of an account
is not enforced by motion and order; instead the plaintiff is precluded from introducing
evidence in regard to those items as to which he has not furnished defendant with a
bill of particulars within five days after a demand for it. CAT. CODE Civ. Pnac. (Deer-
ing, 1935) § 454.
80. See note 14, supra.
81. COLO. CODE CIV. PROc. AN-,. ("Mills, 1933) §§ 56, 66; NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer,
1929) §§ 8596, 8623.
82. Banco Nacional Ultramarino v. Newton, 278 Fed. 207 (E. D. N. Y. 1921);
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Campbell, 95 Conn. 399, 111 All. 864 (1920); Fol-
som v. Brawn, 25 N.H. 114 (1852) ; Irwin v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 39 Wash. 346, 81 Pac.
849 (1905).
83. CoMMMrrEr REPoRT, Rule 12(e); see also Pnrtp ixAR DRAMr, Rule 17.
84. ComtrrrE REPnRT, Rule 12(e).
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ing to the complaint or that it even limits its broader allegations to
the matters specified in the bill.85
But the motion to make more definite and certain and the motion for
bill of particulars may be used for delay as easily as the demurrer. A
recognition of the dilatory character of the latter motion8" has in two
states led to efforts toward reform. The Pennsylvania Practice Act has
been construed as imposing upon the pleader the duty of furnishing par-
ticulars in the first instance, with a right in the other party to enforce
compliance by motion." New York has chosen the opposite expedient
of allowing the defendant to demand particulars of the plaintiff without
motion and placing the burden upon the plaintiff to contest the defend-
ant's right.8" Since the defendant is usually as aware as the plaintiff
of the details of the transaction sued upon, the furnishing of particulars
is useful in but few cases. The New York provision- one, in effect,
for particulars as a matter of course - while eliminating sub judice hear-
ings to some extent, still involves a dilatory step. From this point of
view the Pennsylvania solution is, at least in theory, preferable to the
New York one. It establishes a norm which has a definite effect upon
usage. But the procedural step of a motion will not be eliminated in
cases where the plaintiff in fact fails to supply particulars or where, par-
ticulars having been supplied, the defendant deliberately seeks delay. And
the very standard the statute sets up is likely to afford encouragement
to lengthy, detailed pleading -a result which the new Federal Rules are
seeking to avoid. By limiting the right to the statement of matters "not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him [the
other party] to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial,"
the proposed federal rule sets up a flexible yard stick for determining
when particulars should be given. This pragmatic approach is certainly
in advance of the present attitude of the many courts which attempt to
measure the pleading in the light of some general standard of particularity
of allegation; but it probably would have been preferable to limit the right
even further, placing definitely upon the party making the motion the
burden of establishing his need for further statement. The provisions for
85. Marshall v. Sackett &' Wilhelms Co., 166 App. Div. 141, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1045
(2d Dep't, 1915); Colby v. Wilson, 320 Ill. 416, 151 N. E. 269 (1926).
86. See SECOND REPORT OF THE N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1936) 147; Ass'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CIT oF N. Y., YAR BOOK (1932) 273.
87. See PA. PRACTICE ACT (1915) §§ 5 and 21; SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA PRAC-
TICE AcT (4th ed. 1936) 164. It has been observed that the motion for bill of particu-
lars has become obsolete under the Practice Act, for every proper claim embodies a
bill of particulars. King v. Brillhart, 271 Pa. 301, 305 (1921) ; see Philadelphia Storage
Battery Co. v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 274 Fed. 216, 217 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
88. N. Y. RULES OF CivIL PRACTICE, Rule 115, authorized by N.Y. C. P. A. § 246,
as amended by N. Y. LAWS (1936) c. 241.
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discovery, without encumbering the pleadings, provide the opposite party
ample opportunity for preparing his case.89
IV. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
Liberal provision for the amendment of pleadings is a desirable com-
plement to restriction of objections for substance and form; and, indeed,
in the course of procedural reform efforts towards these ends have closely
paralleled each other. Before the use of written pleadings, demurrers and
other technical objections were not recognized, and parties were permitted
to amend freely. Holdsworth suggests that the rule that a pleader's words
were not effective until endorsed by his client no doubt made a pleading
capable of amendment until one was reached by which the attorney could
abide.90 When in the fourteenth century written pleadings were intro-
duced, formalism developed, and cases were often dismissed and judg-
ments arrested and reversed for formal defects. Amendment was rarely
allowed." Since the beginning of the last century, the tendency has
been in the opposite direction. It culminated in the Rules adopted under
the Judicature Act, which provided that at any stage of the proceeding
either party may, with the permission of the court,12 "alter or amend
his endorsement or pleadings, in such manner and on such terms as may
be just. . . . " But amendments without leave may be made by the
plaintiff at any time within the period limited for his reply; a similar
privilege is accorded to the defendant at any time before his answer
to the reply is due.94
Before the drafting of the new rules the federal practice at law and
in equity differed. Under the Conformity Act the usual variety of rules
has governed the practice in suits at law. The codes have tended, however,
to follow the English provision ;" for example, in California "Any plead-
ing may be amended once by the party of course, and without costs, at
89. See generally Coaaiirrz REPoRT, Rules 26-37.
90. Holdsworth, Pleading, in 2 Sairer ESSAYS rx AwcW-AmxxcAN LEGAL HIs'ron
(1907) 614.
91. See generally CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 495.
92. The progressive attitude of the courts in interpreting their discretion under
this Rule is indicated by the statement of Bramwell, L. J., in Tildesley v. Harper, 10
Ch. D. 393, 396 (1878): "Mly practice has always been to give leave to amend unless
I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blun-
der, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by
costs or otherwise." See also Brett, M1. R., in Claramede v. Commercial Union Assn.,
32 W. R. 262, 263 (1883).
93. RULES OF THE SUPaEM CouRT (1883) 0. xxviii, r. 1; see ANNUAL PRAcTIcE
(1935) 458 et seq.
94. RULES OF THE SUPaEM CouRT (1883) 0. xxviii, rr. 2 and 3; see ANuAuL PRAc-
TicE (1935) 467.
95. For complete list of statutes, see CLARK, COD PLEADING (1928) 497, n. 29.
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any time before answer or demurrer filed, or after demurrer and before
the trial of the issue of law thereon, by filing the same as amended
"..,9 But this amendment as a matter of right is not allowed under
the Federal Equity Rules; Rule 19 provides only that the court may
permit amendment "at any time in furtherance of justice, upon such
terms as may be just." Under this language it has been held that amend-
ment is always at the discretion of the court, whose leave must be sought
upon application."
The proposed federal rule 98 represents a compromise between the
present equity rule and the practice obtaining in England and under the
codes. Amendment before trial is allowed as a matter of right only
before the other party has served his responsive pleading. 9 Afterwards
"a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party."' "" It is specifically stated, however, that
leave "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
10 1
In the provision for amendments during the course of trial the new
Rules take advanced ground. Of course, in all jurisdictions such amend-
ments are now allowed under some circumstances.' - Rule 22(b) of the
preliminary draft, however, made actual amendment during trial unnec-
cessary in some cases. During the trial the pleadings were to be "deemed
amended to conform to all the evidence received without objection." And
if a party objected that evidence offered at trial was outside the scope
of the pleadings and could show actual prejudice to the maintenance on
the merits of his action or defense, the court had power to sustain the
objection or to allow amendment of the pleadings. In the latter case
the court could grant a continuance "upon such terms as are just." But,
the rule added, " . . . if the objecting party fails to show to the satis-
faction of the court that the admission of such evidence would actually
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits, the
96. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 472. Amendment at a later point in the
proceeding, however, is allowed only upon application to the court.
97. Ball v. Breed, Elliott & Harrison, 294 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Electric
Management & Engineering Corp. v. United Power & Light Corp., 19 F. (2d) 311
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927); cf. Merten v. Fertig, 281 Fed. 908 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
98. COMMITrEE REPORT, Rule 15; see also PRELIMINARY DaurAF, Rule 22(a).
99. Under the English Rules and most of the codes, as already pointed out, a party
may amend as a matter of right until some specified time after the responsive pleading
is filed.
100. CoemmirE REPORT, Rule 15 (a).
101. Ibid.
102. The courts are naturally less generous in allowing amendments during the trial
than before the trial has begun. Cf. Todd v. Bettingen, 102 Minn. 260, 113 N. W. 906
(1907) ; Christen v. Christen, 184 Ky. 822, 213 S. W. 189 (1919). But the present atti-
tude is, on the whole, rather liberal, particularly in an absence of prejudice to the oppo-
site party. Ebner Gold Min. Co. v. Alaska-Juneau Gold Co., 210 Fed. 599 (C. C. A.
9th, 1914); Western Coal & Min. Co. v. McCallum, 237 Fed. 1003 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
[Vol. 47: 50
OBJECTIONS TO PLEADINGS
court shall overrule the objection and the pleadings shall be deemed
amended so that the evidence objected to becomes admissible under the
pleadings."
The final draft of the provision"0 3 varies in two particulars. Where
no prejudice to the other party is shown the court may order a party to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence; under the preliminary
draft the pleading would be deemed amended without more. And where
prejudice to the other party is shown, the court apparently must sustain
the objection to the introduction of evidence, while under the earlier rule
the court had the alternative of allowing actual amendment. The differ-
ence in the two drafts is perhaps not so great as their language would
seem to indicate; the flexibility of the concept of "prejudice" will allow
courts freedom in sustaining objections to evidence outside the scope
of the pleadings, or in allowing amendment, or in granting continuances
whenever desirable. But one virtue of the preliminary draft, the provision
for implied amendment in all cases where no prejudice is shown on the
objection, is not present in the final draft, which limits implied amend-
ment to cases where no objection is made. Actual physical amendment
of the pleadings during the course of the trial would seem to be a gesture
resulting merely in delay. However, the final draft does provide that
"when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings." While this relates primarily to the situa-
tion where evidence is received without objection,104 it would seem broad
enough to embrace also the situation where evidence is objected to as
outside the scope of the pleadings, leave to amend is granted but not
acted upon, and the parties assume that the amendment has been made.
In many jurisdictions the pleading is deemed amended in such a case,103
and the new rule will probably be similarly applied.
103. CoMTTrrEE REPORT, Rule 15 (b).
104. This principle is considerably more liberal than the common law doctrine of
"aider by verdict". See TIDD, PRAcrIcE *8-6; CLARKC, CODE PLEADIN;G (1928) 519.
But the broader attitude adopted by the new rule is now followed in many jurisdic-
tions. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Rogers, 146 Ark. 232, 236, 225 S. W. 640, 641
(1920) (complaint failed to allege necessary elements of statutory remedy) ; Arkansas
Bankers' Assn. v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S. W. 4 (1927) (in suit for reward com-
plaint failed to allege that plaintiff was motivated by offer); Gould v. Gould, 99 Wash.
204, 169 Pac. 324 (1917) (reply denied alteration of note rather than raising defense
of alteration by stranger which was established at trial) ; Apfelbacher v. State, 167 Wis.
233, 167 N. IV. 244 (1918) (complaint framed on theory of prescriptive rights rather
than riparian rights which were established at trial). Accord: Radio C. A. Victor
Co. v. Daugherty, 191 Ark. 401, 86 S. V. (2d) 559 (1935); Newman v. Kirk, 164
Okla. 147, 23 Pac. (2d) 163 (1933).
105. See, e.g., Brantz v. Marcus, 73 Iowa 64, 35 N. V. 115 (1837); Excelsior Mfg.
Co. v. Boyle, 46 Kan. 202, 26 Pac. 408 (1891); Home v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326 (1874);
United States v. Trollinger, 81 Fed. (2d) 167, 169 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). In Kuhn v.
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The provision on the "relation back" of amendments represents another
forward advance in pleading reform:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading." 106
The general doctrine represented by this section is already recognized. 107
But there has been considerable confusion as to how great a change may
be made in the complaint where, for example, the Statute of Limitations
has run against the cause of action. The usual rule has been that the
amended complaint may not set up a new "cause of action." 108 Some
courts have tended to apply the formulary theory of the common law
and have made "cause of action" virtually synonymous with "form of
action."10 9 The more sensible rule, and the one now in more general favor
in the federal courts,110 is to view the cause of action as a group of
operative facts; the extent of the cause of action is determined prag-
matically, with an eye to trial convenience. 1 The proposed new rule
clearly adopts such an approach by its use of the phrase "conduct, trans-
Gustafson, 73 Iowa 633, 35 N. W. 660 (1887), the declaration was deemed amended
even though defendant objected to the introduction of evidence which was proper only
under an allowed amendment, where he did not call to the attention of the court that
the amendment was never made. For the view contrary to these cases sce,.e.g., Haus-
ken v. Coman; 66 N. D. 633, 268 N. W. 430 (1936).
Pleadings and writs have been deemed amended also where leave to amend was grant-
ed before trial but never acted upon ICarter v. Fischer, 127 Ala. 52, 28 So. 376 (1900);
Sobiesktr v. Chicago, 241 Ill. App.'180 (1926); Ufford v. Lucas, 9 N. C. 214 (1822)
(writ)], and where leave to amed to substitute or add parties was granted but such
amendment was not made. Alameda County v. Crocker, 125 Cal. 101, 57 Pac. 766
(1899); Ferris v. Jones, 78 Okla. -154, 189 Pac. 527 (1920). Contra: Motejaitis v.
Johnson, 117 Conn. 631, 169 Atl. 606 (1933).
106. CommTr E REPoRT. Rule 15 (c).
107. See generally CLAR, CODE PLEADING (1928) § 116.
108. Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922), (1922)
32 YALE L. J. 198; Walters v. Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651 (1909). In the Capps
case the plaintiff changed his claim from one under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to one under a local statute; the holding was that this was a new "cause of action"
and was barred by limitations. Cf. Luce v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 241 N. Y.
541, 150 N. E. 546 (1925), aff'g. 213 App. Div. 374, 211 N. Y. Supp. 184 (4th Dep't
1925).
109. See, e.g., Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 14 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926), aff'd,
275 U. S. 431 (1928) ; Hall v. Louisville & N. R. R., 157 Fed. 464 (N. D. Fla. 1907) ;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Jones, 149 I1. 361, 37 N. E. 247 (1894). On the common law
background of this approach see SHIPmAN, COMmoN LAW PLEADING (3d ed. 1923)
296; CH Try, PLEADING *219. For a defense of this theory see (1919) 3 MINN. L. Rpy.
132; (1926) lOid. 417, 424.
110. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62 (1933).
111. See Clark, The Cause of Actionv (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 354.
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action, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth,"11 - instead
of the more easily narrowed phrase "cause of action." This is apparently
the first provision to outlaw so definitely the formulary attitude."'
V. FORMULATION OF ISSUES
The rigidity of written pleadings should be soniewhat modified by
the pre-trial procedure proposed in Rule 16 of the new Rules:
"In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
"(1) The simplification of the issues;
"(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleading;
"(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of docu-
ments which will avoid unnecessary proof;
"(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
"(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by
jury;
"(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
The method of operation of this new principle is furnished in the pro-
visions for a discretionary pre-trial calendar and for an order embodying
the results of the conference.' 14
Continental law has inherited the Roman law tradition of "orality"
in the development of issues." After informatory statements by the
litigants, the magistrate determines the issues of fact involved in the
controversy. These issues are then written down by a court official and
112. Commir REPozr, Rule 15 (c).
113. Some modem statutes have attempted to avert the "cause of action" muddle by
stating some other criterion. The Washington code, for example, provides that the
action shall not be barred "if the adverse party was fairly apprised of its nature by the
original pleading, and that the plaintiff was claiming thereunder, provided no new party
is added thereby." ,VAsir. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 303-3. For a some-
what different effort in this direction see A. CODE Axiq. (Michie, 1928) § 9513.
114. "The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the confer-
egce, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties
as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered shall
control the subsequent course of the action. The court in its discretion may establish
by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above
provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or extend it to all actions."
Commrnx REPoaR, Rule 16.
115. For a comparative study see Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Plead-
ing (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 517; see also Buc~mxAz, Tim MArN Iz;sTTUTIoS or Ro MAZ
Pi-vATE LAw (1931) 346 et seq.; Sonm, INsTrrT s (Ledlie trans. 1901) 237 c seq.
The development of modern Continental practice from the Roman background is traced
in Millar, Legal Procedure (1934) 12 ENCYC. Soc. ScIENcS 439, 442-445.
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henceforth guide the course of the trial and the introduction of evi-
dence. 16 On the other hand, common law procedure, always with an
eye to the limitations of the jury system,"" has felt the necessity of
developing precise issues by means of written pleadings.' Whether such
pleadings are in fact necessary is debatable ;... but in any event it is clear
that the flexibility of the civil law system is an advantage, and that any
reform contributing this element to the Anglo-American system is a
distinct gain.
In the 1921 report of the Massachusetts Judicial Commission it was
said:
"A century ago Jeremy Bentham made a suggestive classification
of methods of procedure into 'epistolary' methods and 'confrontatory'
methods, and he made caustic remarks about the 'epistolary' kind.
The comparison may be simply translated into the statement that
one can generally find out more quickly about facts by talking
directly to a man who knows about them than by conducting a
long and cautious correspondence with him or with somebody repre-
senting him. This simple idea has been very gradually forcing its
way into legislation and rules of court relative to procedure. ' 120
One of the results, perhaps, of Bentham's trenchant criticism of the
whole system of written pleadings 2' was the adoption of section 42 of
the Common Law Procedure Act.' It provided that when the parties
to a cause are agreed on the questions of fact to be litigated and there
are no legal issues, they may proceed to trial of the factual questions
after the writ is issued and by order of the judge, without the necessity
of formal pleadings.' 23  This provision is repeated in substance in the
116. Millar, Some Comparative Aspects of Civil Pleading under Anglo-American
and Continental Systen (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 401.
117. See Carmody, Effect on Trial by Jury of Certain Reforms in Pleading (1927)
4 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 104.
118. See CHITTY, PLADING *235; (1897) 10 HARV. L. Ray. 238.
119. For an opinion that precise issues were better developed under the formulary
procedure see Kocourek, Tie Formula Procedure of Roman Law (1922) 8 VA. L. RaV.
337, 338.
120. SECOND REP. Or MASS. JUDICIAL COMM. (1921) 107; see REP. OF N. Y. BOARD
OF STATUTORY CONsOiaDATIoN (1915) 21, 205-07.
121. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1893) 7 WORxs 270-72; Bentham,
Principles of Judicial Procedure (1893) 2 WoRxs 4849.
122. 15 & 16 Vicr., c. 76 (1858).
123. In contrast to this procedure is the statutory "submission of controversy without
action," which is appropriate where the parties disagree as to the legal effect of facts
not in dispute. The parties submit the controversy to court of proper jurisdiction on
an agreed statement of facts accompanied by an affidavit that the controversy is a real
one and the proceeding is had in good faith. See, e.g., CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. (Deer-
ing, 1937) § 1138; IDAio CODE ANN. (1932) c. 7, §§ 1001-03; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Ver-
non, 1932) §§ 1097-98; N. Y. Civ. Pmlc. Acr §§ 546-47. Apparently the procedure was
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Rules adopted under the Judicature Act.2 4 But here is found the addi-
tional provision that "Where in any cause or matter it appears to the
court or a judge that the issues of fact in dispute are not sufficiently
defined, the parties may be directed to prepare issues, and such issues
shall, if the parties differ, be settled by a court or a judge." 10 It is difficult
to determine how widely this procedure has been used. But Sir George
Jessel said, in 1876, "My practise is always to get the counsel on both
sides to agree what are the issues of fact to be tried before we start.
For instance, in a patent case we settle before we begin whether the
issue is novelty or infringement."'
The purpose of this type of procedure, of course, is to be certain that
the issues to be tried are those over which there is actual dispute. A
somewhat similar problem prompted the suggestion made in 1927 by
the Committee to Propose Specific Reforms in the Law of Evidence.
Realizing that loss of time and confusion of the jury and of the witnesses
result from objections to evidence, the committee proposed that the
court exclude such objections when the evidence relates to matters not
in dispute.127 It was believed that such a rule would do much to eliminate
the "sporting" approach to the lawsuit. However, the committee might
have gone farther and suggested that no evidence at all be heard otn
matters not in honest dispute. This is the logical result of their criticism
of the existing practice, and forms the basis of proposed Rule 16.3 s
Because the use of this pre-trial procedure is left to the discretion of
the court, it is possible that many district judges will not employ the
unknown at common law. It is not specifically provided in the new Rules but should
be availalle under the broad provisions for summary judgment. See Co nm R-
PORT, Rule 38.
124. Rurxs OF THE SUPREME Courr (1883) 0. zcxiv, r. 9; AuUAL PRAcrc (1935)
570.
125. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (1883) 0. xxiii, r. 1; ANNUA PRAcrxcs (1935)
551. This particular provision seems to contemplate a further definition of issues after
written pleadings have been filed. Hence it is more clearly the precedent for Ameri-
tan reforms in this direction than is O. xxxv, r. 9, which dispenses with formal plead-
ings. In Massachusetts and New Jersey the "framing of issues" is not in lieu of
pleadings, but in addition to it. MASs. ANN. LAws (Lawyers' Co-op. 1933) c. 214,
§§ 34-36; N. J. RULS OF THE SUPREME CoUrT (1929) Rule 31; N. J. PnAc. Acr (1903)
§ 126. This is true of the proposed federal rule, already discussed.
126. Lowe v. Lowe, 10 Ch. D. 432, 433-34 (1878). For a description of the prac-
tical operation of the procedure, see Higgins, English Courts and Procedure (1924)
7 J. Am. Jur. Soc. 185, 213-14. A related procedural device is the "summons for direc-
tions," which is a disposal of this and all other preliminary issues before masters. See
ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (10th ed. 1930) 8 et seq.; Leaing, Masters: The Time
Savers (1920) 5 MAss. L. Q. 250. For a construction of the rule on framing issues, see
Howell v. Dering, [1915] 1 K. B. 54, 66, holding that the rule applies only where there
is no doubt as to the actual subject of the dispute.
127. See MORGAN, AND OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) 1-7.
128. See p. 69 and note 111, supra.
19371
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
unfamiliar practice here contemplated. However, from the experience
of those courts which are willing to frame issues, much may be learned
about the practicality of reforms in this direction. 12 9 It is certain that
where applied the new procedure will tend to make less of a straight-
jacket of written pleadings, and will aid to clarify issues and shorten
trials. If successful enough, the English practice might be followed and
such formulation used as an alternative to written pleadings.
Whether the elimination of written pleadings should be an ultimate
ideal of procedural reform it is certainly too early to say. But it is im-
portant in the settlement of controversies that matters of pleading should
not bulk too large. This is an objective of the new Federal Rules.
The demurrer, encrusted with formality, has been replaced by the less
onerous answer and motion. Procedural steps will be eliminated by the
requirement of consolidation of motions. The motions to make more
definite and certain and for bill of particulars have been somewhat re-
stricted. Pleadings may be freely amended. And an informal method
of orally arriving at the real issues of the case- apart from the plead-
ings - has been furnished. There is ample reason to hope that under
the new federal procedure the role which pleadings play will be subordin-
ated to the general objects of the judicial process.
129. Efforts in this direction have met with considerable success. See (1937) 20 3.
Am. JUD. Soc. 247. (experience in Suffolk County, Massachusetts); id. at 249 (expe-
rience in Los Angeles County, California). Similar rules are in force in Detroit and
Cleveland, and one substantially like the proposed federal rule is under consideration
in New York. N. Y. LAW SOCIETY, A PROPOSAL FOR MINIMIZING CALENDAR DELAY IN
JURY CASES (1936); N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNcIL, PE-TRIAL PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRA-
T ON (1937); cf. Ass'N OF THE BAR or THE CITY OF N. Y., REPORT OF TH, COMMITTE
ON LAW REFORM ON TWO PROPOSALS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR REFORM IN
PE-TRIAL PROCEDURE (1936).
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